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BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Introduction
On August 12, 1994, for the eighth time in the last twenty-two
years, conflict between the Major League Baseball Owners (Owners)
and players resulted in a strike.'
One specific body of law American businesses must adhere to is
antitrust. However, the business of Major League Baseball (Baseball)
receives favorable treatment; it is currently exempt from antitrust
laws.2 Surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court in Flood v.
Kuhn3 exempted only Baseball, excluding the National Football
League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the
National Hockey League (NHL) from the privilege. Baseball is un-
doubtedly big business. In fact, the Major League Baseball Economic
Study Committee found that in 1992 the average revenue made by
each team was fifty-six million dollars.4 Moreover, from 1982 through
1992, revenues have had an average growth rate of ten percent. 5 In-
credibly high revenues, coupled with an exceptional growth rate,
clearly indicate that Baseball is big business. Further, the Flood Court
acknowledged that antitrust laws would apply in any other business.
The Court stated, "[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is en-
gaged in interstate commerce." 6 Further, after recognizing the unique
exemption Baseball maintains, the Court explained, "if there is any
inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of
long standing."7
Baseball's Owners have primarily used the antitrust immunity to
establish a reserve clause in the Major League Agreement8 as well as
to restrict franchise expansion and franchise relocation.9 As evi-
denced by a recent fiasco in which San Francisco kept the Giants and
St. Petersburg, Florida lost the team they rightfully deserved, the
1. Dan Shaughnessy, They're Out! Players Strike Brings Baseball to a Standstill, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1994, at 1.
2. The antitrust law applied to American business is the federal Sherman Antitrust
Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several states ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id. § 2.
3. 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).
4. Baseball's Antitrust Immunity, 1992: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
90 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing 1].
5. Id. at 2.
6. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
7. Id. at 284.
8. Hearing 1, supra note 4 (opening statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
9. Id. at 364-66 (statement of Prof. Roger G. Noll, Stanford University).
19951
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Owners used the exemption without regard for the good of the Amer-
ican public. 10 Furthermore, Baseball has consistently failed to disci-
pline players and Owners at the expense of the American public. Yet
the antitrust exemption depends on Baseball acting for the public
interest."
Given the current state of Baseball, this Note will focus on
whether the exemption is still warranted given Baseball's recurrent
actions and decisions that blatantly disregard the public interest. Part
I will set forth the case law. Part II will discuss the advantages the
exemption gives Baseball. Part III will focus on congressional re-
sponse to the exemption. Part IV will deal with the disempowerment
of the Baseball Commissioner. Part V will discuss Baseball's disre-
gard for the public interest. Part VI touches on proposals to deal with
Baseball's exemption.
I
Background: The History of Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption
The starting point is the Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs. 2 The Court determined that Baseball, although a
business, neither operated interstate nor was the subject of commerce.
The federal antitrust laws, therefore, did not apply to Baseball. 3 Fed-
eral Baseball gave Baseball's Owners the right to operate their busi-
ness in a cartel-like fashion. 4
Thirty-one years later, in Toolson v. New York Yankees,' 5 the
Court upheld baseball's antitrust exemption by again holding that
Baseball was not a business taking part in interstate commerce.'
6
10. Ross Newhan, Giants Will Remain in San Francisco, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at
Al. Senator Connie Mack said, "I don't believe the antitrust exemption was ever intended
to control the movement of franchises .... It's time to end all doubt and revoke baseball's
abused antitrust privilege." Id. Florida's other Senator, Bob Graham "said the interests of
baseball and free enterprise 'are both being lost in defense of a good ol' boy operation."'
Id.
11. Although the Supreme Court would deem congressional silence as the basis for
maintaining the exemption, Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84, Congress has maintained the exemp-
tion in exchange for Baseball acting in the best interests of the American public. Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption, 1993: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993) [hereinafter
Hearing 21.
12. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
13. Id. at 208-09.
14. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 1.
15. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
16. Id. at 357.
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Moreover, the Court conveyed that Congress had remained silent for
thirty years, and any prospective action to lift Baseball's antitrust ex-
emption would have to come through legislation. 7
Baseball's antitrust exemption would not come under the scrutiny
of the Court again until 1972, in Flood v. Kuhn.'8 At issue was the
"reserve clause" Baseball included in all player contracts.' 9 The re-
serve clause restricted players' abilities to freely market their talents
on a yearly basis.2° Whether Baseball could maintain the reserve
clause in player contracts rested on whether antitrust law applied.2' If
the Court found Baseball exempt, the clause would be upheld.22
The Flood opinion is very different from Federal Baseball and
Toolson. Flood placed Baseball on a pedestal as an American pastime
which deserves special treatment. In fact, the opening of the opinion
reads more like a baseball retrospective than the opinion of the
Supreme Court. The Court begins the opinion by literally referring to
baseball in poetic terms, eliciting "Casey at the Bat" and a list of
ninety baseball greats.23 The footnote which follows reads: "These
are names only from earlier years. By mentioning some, one risks
unintended omission of others equally celebrated. '24
The Flood Court specifically contradicts both Federal Baseball
and Toolson by acknowledging that "professional baseball is a busi-
ness and it is engaged in interstate commerce. '25 Notwithstanding this
acknowledgement, the Court again refused to lift the antitrust exemp-
tion and stated,
baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly...
the aberration is an established one, and one that has been recog-
nized... for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to
the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's
expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition
and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristic and needs.
26
Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that football, boxing, basket-
ball, and, presumably, hockey are not exempt.27 Highlighting Base-
17. Id.
18, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
19. Id. at 259.
20. Id. The reserve clause results in "the confinement of the player to the club that
has him under the contract; the assignability of the player's contract, and the ability of the
club annually to renew the contract unilaterally, subject to a stated salary minimum." Md
21. Id. at 285.
22. Id.
23. Id at 262.
24. Id at 263 n.3.
25. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 282.
26. Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 282-83.
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ball's antitrust exemption, the Court ultimately concluded that it is
within Congress' province to lift the exemption, not the Court's.
28
II
Advantages of the Exemption: Franchises Playing
Shotgun Economics
Due to the antitrust exemption, the league has the ultimate
power to decide what applying cities will obtain new or relocating
franchises. Moreover, Baseball has created a fictional scarcity of
franchises. This fictional scarcity allows Baseball to force public mu-
nicipalities to grant incredible subsidies to local franchises. However,
since Owners have so much power, they "can use the anti-trust ex-
emption immunity to either block or approve a franchise reloca-
tion."29 As stated by Senator Howard Metzenbaum, "[t]he decision
seems to depend on what is in their best interest at the time. "30
The mechanics of this economic terrorism are as follows: A ma-
jor city such as such as St. Petersburg, Florida builds a world class
facility31 in an area which can definitely support a Major League team.
The city submits a proposal to the League and pays a fee.32 In the
proposal is a figure which a suitor city is willing to pay for a certain
franchise.3 3 However, Baseball has complete control over any negoti-
ations between a team and a city. Using the threat of relocation, Ma-
jor League teams elicit local governments to provide the franchises
with substantial subsidies, paid for out of public treasuries.' For ex-
ample, four different Major League franchises threatened to relocate
to St. Petersburg, Florida.35 None of the teams actually moved to St.
Petersburg, but the threat of moving brought each team subsidies
from their respective municipalities.36 Other examples of cities which
gave up large sums of public funds are Philadelphia, Arlington, and
San Diego.37
28. Id. at 284.
29. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 151 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 387.
32. Id. at 396-97.
33. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 151.
34. Arthur T. Johnson, Municipal Administration and the Sports Franchise Relocation
Issue, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 519, 520-22 (1983).
35. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 387. The four teams were the Oakland Athletics, Chi-
cago White Sox, Seattle Mariners, and San Francisco Giants.
36. Id.
37. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989).
Recent examples of wealth transfers from taxpayers to sports team owners in-
clude: ... Philadelphia Phillies-Philadelphia phased out a ticket tax, provided
[Vol. 17:737
It is evident that Baseball often acts contrary to public policy re-
garding franchise relocation. The threat of the San Francisco Giants
relocating to St. Petersburg, Florida effectively illustrated the shotgun
economics of Baseball. In addition, it also serves to illustrate the
abuse of authority currently exercised by Owners.
A. Relocation and the St. Petersburg Debacle
Due to the antitrust exemption, Owners have the final say on
franchise relocation. They also have the final say as to letting new
franchises into the league.
In 1992 Bob Lurie, then the sole owner of the San Francisco Gi-
ants, decided to sell the team due to economic woes in San Fran-
cisco. 38 On June 11, 1992, Commissioner Fay Vincent gave Lurie
permission to enter into "explorations, discussions, and ultimately a
contract to sell and relocate the Giants."39 On August 6, 1992, negoti-
ations were finalized between Bob Lurie and the Tampa Bay Investor
Group (Tampa Bay Investors).4' The deal was to be finalized at a
meeting on September 9, 1992, subject to the approval of the Own-
ers.4 However, following the submission of the Tampa Bay Investors
offer to Baseball's Ownership Committee, the committee began to im-
pede the process. The committee made repeated revisions to the pro-
posal, then asked the Tampa Bay Investors to further clarify certain
the Phillies with $1 million for a new outfield scoreboard, and assumed $745,000
annually in debt service payments for a Panavision scoreboard the Phillies in-
stalled. The city also allowed the Phillies to construct special baseball suites and
keep 60% of the related revenue, resulting in a $2.5 million revenue re-allocation
from the city to the Phillies ....
Texas Rangers-To induce [the] relocation of a professional baseball team, the
City of Arlington purchased local broadcasting rights for 10 years from the team
owners for $3 million more than it could recover. Arlington also publicly funded
the renovation of Texas Stadium and provided a highly advantageous lease. The
total price tag was estimated at $21 million.
Id. at 650 n.28.
Other wealth transfers have been more direct:
Faced with the imminent sale of the San Diego Padres to an owner bent on mov-
ing the team to the east coast, the San Diego City Council voted to advance the
team enough cash to make bonus payments owed to 10 players, while efforts to
find a local owner continued.
Id. at 649 n.24.
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issues.42 These stall tactics ultimately resulted in the failure of the
Owners to take a vote on the relocation at the September meeting. 43
At the Owners' meeting, however, National League President
Bill White announced that Baseball would accept a purchase offer
from yet unnamed San Francisco investors; no timetable nor require-
ments for a competitive bid were set. This was all done despite an
exclusive contractual agreement between the Tampa Bay Investors
and Bob Lurie requiring Lurie to neither accept nor negotiate other
offers for his team until Baseball had acted on the Tampa Bay offer.
4
To demonstrate the Owners' utter disregard for the contract between
Lurie and the Tampa Bay Investors, White explained,
Bob Lurie is a man of his word and he has given the St. Petersburg
group his word that he will not accept an offer. I will accept an offer
.... I will accept an offer from the people in San Francisco and
then the League will have to decide what they will do with that
offer.45
In the meantime, the Owners refused to receive any further bids from
the Tampa Bay Investors or negotiate with them. At the same time,
they permitted complete negotiations to go forward with the San
Francisco group of investors. 6 Ultimately, the Owners approved the
purchase of the Giants by a San Francisco group for ninety-four mil-
lion dollars,47 despite the offer of $115 million from Tampa Bay
Investors.48
Baseball clearly used the antitrust exemption to hold the San
Francisco tax payers hostage and to deny the fans in St. Petersburg a
Major League Baseball franchise they had spent years trying to ob-
tain. To retain the Giants, San Francisco taxpayers were forced to
indemnify San Francisco investors for any lawsuits that might be in-
curred due to acquisition of the Giants.49 At the same time, the Gi-
ants signed outfielder Barry Bonds to a six-year, forty-three million
dollar contract °.5 All these concessions were made by the city despite
the fact Bay Area voters had rejected the building of a new stadium to
replace Candlestick Park four straight times.' If the people of San
Francisco truly wanted to keep the Giants, they would have voted to




46. Id. at 396.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 387.
49. Id. at 394.
50. Id. at 395.
51. Id. at 391-92.
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build the Giants a new stadium. Despite public ambivalence to keep
the Giants, the city council used city funds to keep the Giants in San
Francisco.
52
Conversely, St. Petersburg, Florida had complete public support
for a Major League franchise, The city negotiated a twenty-seven
year lease to house the Giants in the Suncoast Dome; 4.6 million peo-
ple live within a two hour drive of the dome, and 31,000 fans had
made deposits on season tickets. 3 In contrast, San Francisco had sold
only 10,700 season-tickets as of the same date, and even with aggres-
sive marketing hoped to sell only about 17,000.14 Despite overwhelm-
ing public support in St. Petersburg, the Owners manipulated the rules
of Baseball to keep the Giants in San Francisco. The Owners used
their undaunted authority, in place because of the antitrust immunity,
to leave the people of St. Petersburg without a Major League
franchise.
B. Reserve System
The reserve system currently makes its largest impact in minor
league baseball.55 In most businesses, as individuals are developing
their careers, they are free to interview and negotiate with competing
employers for salaries and advancement opportunities. This is not the
case in Baseball. When a player signs with a minor league team, the
contract is owned and controlled by the major league franchise which
52. William Carlsen, St, Petersburg to Pay Lawyers in Giants Fight, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9,
1993, at A15.
Last year, San Francisco city officials agreed to pay all legal costs and damages
resulting from the effort to keep the team, including the legal bills of the new
local ownership group that is not completing the purchase of the team ... In
October, the San Francisco city attorney's office announced that 10 San Francisco
law firms had volunteered up to $3 million in free legal services to defend the city
in threatened lawsuits from St. Petersburg.
Id. Dave Kindred, It's Time to Let the Giants Go, SPORTINo NEWS, Oct. 5, 1992, at 5.
That indemnification ... is an interesting way of defeating the taxpayers' loudly
voiced opinions. The taxpayers vote down a stadium because they don't want to
spend the millions of dollars it would cost. So the city council, needing no refer-
endum to do its work, agrees, in essence, to spend the taxpayers' millions of dol-
lars in a probable lawsuit to keep the Giants-and the taxpayers later would be
asked again to build a stadium.
Id.
53. Id. at 398-99.
54. Glenn Dickey, Sound Advice for Giants, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 1993, at B2.
55. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 412. "The minor leagues are funded by the Major
League franchises. Players drafted from college develop their skills in the minor leagues,
and some minor league players make it to the major leagues." Id. (statement of Rorie
Harrison, former major and minor league player).
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owns the minor league team.56 Since Baseball is exempt from anti-
trust laws, it can maintain the reserve clause in player contracts.
When a new player signs his first contract, he is completely bound to
that major league franchise for six years.57
This has serious implications for professional athletes. The aver-
age minor league player who comes out of college is twenty-two years
old5 8 and makes an average of $10,000 a year.59 These players are
bound until they are twenty-eight years old, which is not a young age
in professional athletics. The reserve system is most harmful to a mi-
nor league player who is athletically ready to make the jump to the
major leagues yet is prohibited from doing so. This often occurs when
the team that owns the player's rights does not have an opening on
their major league roster for that player's position. Since the Owner
would not want a competing franchise to obtain the outstanding minor
league player, it keeps the player buried in the minor leagues for the
remainder of the six years. Hence, many minor league players are
forbidden from marketing their skills freely and, due to the antitrust
exemption, will not be able to market themselves until six years after
their first contract.
C. Cases Involving the Reserve System and Franchise Relocation and
Acquisition in Nonexempt Professional Sports Leagues
1. NFL Restraints on Franchise Acquisition: Mid-South Grizzlies v.
National Football League
Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League60 involved the
attempt of the Mid-South Grizzlies, formerly of the World Football
League, to become a member of the NFL. The application of the
Grizzlies was rejected by the NFL, and the Grizzlies subsequently
filed suit under antitrust law. 6 1 At issue was the NFL's rejection of
the Grizzlies' application pursuant to the NFL Constitution and By-
laws, Article 3.3(c), which stated that "applicants for membership may
be admitted by the affirmative vote of not less than three-fourths or 20
members, whichever is greater. 62 Ultimately, the court found that
the NFL did a complete study of the implications of the Grizzlies'
entry into the NFL, presented the study to the owners, and put the
56. Id. at 412-13.
57. Id. at 410.
58. Id. at 413.
59. Thomas S. Mulligan, Baseball Antitrust Loophole May Strike Out, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1994, at D1.
60. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
61. Id. at 776.
62. Id. at 787-88.
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application to a vote which was duly rejected.63 The NFL's studied
actions, therefore, did not violate Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act.64
2. NHL and the Reserve System: Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc.65 was brought against the established NHL by the rival,
World Hockey Association (WHA).66 The WHA claimed that the
NHL monopolized professional hockey by including a clause in all of
its clubs' player contracts giving the club a permanent renewable op-
tion on the player when the contract term ended.67 This prevented a
player from playing for any other hockey club until his NHL club no
longer wanted him. Hence, the WHA was unable to employ hockey
players who had played in the NHL without the NHL's consent. As a
result, the WHA could never seriously compete with the NHL.68 In
1972, shortly after the case was filed, the district court judge issued a
preliminary injunction against the NHL's enforcement of these "life-
time reserve clauses" because the clauses probably constituted unlaw-
ful monopolization.69
The NHL's reserve clause would again come under antitrust scru-
tiny in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.," but would prevail due to a
labor exemption which was not in place at the time of the Philadelphia
decision. In McCourt, Pale McCourt, a star hockey player for the
NHL's Detroit Red Wings, brought suit to challenge the league's re-
serve system.71 That system had been agreed upon and set forth in the
first collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the NHL
and the National Hockey League Player's Association (NHLPA).72
Under this reserve system, any team signing a free agent player was
required to compensate the player's old team.73 If the two teams
could not agree on the compensation, each would submit its proposal
to a neutral arbitrator who had to accept one of the two proposals
63. Id. at 786.
64. Id. at 787-88.
65. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
66. Id. at 466-67.
67. Id. at 475.
68. Id. at 518.
69. Id. at 518-19.
70. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
71. Id. at 1195-96.
72. Id. at 1193.
73. Id. at 1204.
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without modification.74 When Rogatien Vachon, an all-star goalie for
the Los Angeles Kings, became a free agent in 1978 and signed a con-
tract with the Red Wings, the arbitrator accepted the Kings' proposal
that McCourt's contract be assigned to them.75 Preferring to play in
Detroit rather than Los Angeles, McCourt refused to report to the
Kings and filed suit alleging that the system under which his contract
could be awarded to any team without either his or his team's consent
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.76
Although the reserve clause on its face could be considered a per
se antitrust violation as a prohibited trade restraint under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, the NHL relied upon the labor exemption estab-
lished in Mackey v. National Football League.77 Hence, the key issue
in the McCourt decision was whether or not the reserve clause was
legitimately negotiated between the NHLPA and the NHL.78 The
court ultimately concluded the reserve clause was a significant issue
discussed amongst the parties and maintained that the reserve clause
was exempt from antitrust law.79
3. NBA Restraints and the Reserve System: Wood v. National Basketball
Association
In Wood v. National Basketball Association80 the issues of arms
length bargaining and the labor exemption presented themselves
again. Leon Wood, a star college basketball player drafted by the
NBA's Philadelphia 76ers, refused to accept a first-year salary offer of
$75,000 dollars s.8  This amount was all the 76ers could pay while also
staying within the team payroll limit that had been established in an
intensively negotiated 1983 modification to the 1976 collective bar-
74. Id. at 1205.
75. Id. at 1195-96.
76. Id.
77. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). For the reserve system provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny, Mackey set forth three broad
principles:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-
eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship .... Second, federal
labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought
to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. [Third],
the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to
override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is
the product of bona fide arm's length bargaining.
Id. at 614.
78. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1198.
79. Id. at 1193.
80. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
81. Id. at 957.
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gaining agreement.' Although the court had little difficulty in finding
that the nonstatutory exemption applied, it did so by citing Mackey
and observing that the collective bargaining agreement provisions au-
thorizing the draft and salary cap were "the result of bona fide arm's
length bargaining.
'83
4. The NFL and Restraints on Franchise Relocation: Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League
At issue in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Na-
tional Football League' was NFL Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL
Constitution which required that no member club shall have the right
to transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within
or outside its home territory, without prior approval by the affirmative
vote of three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the League.
8 5
Home territory is defined in Rule 4.1 as "the city in which [a] club is
located and for which it holds a franchise and plays its home games,
and includes the surrounding territory to the extent of 75 miles in
every direction from the exterior corporate limits of such city."
86
In the instant case, the Oakland Raiders wished to move to the
Los Angeles Coliseum, which would be considered in the "home terri-
tory" of the Los Angeles Rams who played in Anaheim, California. 87
The Raider's application for relocation was denied by the league 22-0
and the Los Angeles Coliseum, in conjunction with co-plaintiff, Raid-
ers-owner Al Davis, brought the antitrust claim charging that Rule 4.3
was illegal.88 The court held that the critical questions to answer are
whether the jury could have determined that Rule 4.3 reasonably
served the NFL's interest in producing and promoting its product, or
whether Rule 4.3 harmed competition among the twenty-eight teams
to such an extent that any benefits to the League as a whole were
outweighed. 9
The NFL unsuccessfully contended that the Rule promoted sta-
bility. The court held that the benefits to the NFL were outweighed
by the harm Rule 4.3 created. 90 The.court explained the competitive
harms of Rule 4.3: "Exclusive territories insulate each team from
82. Id at 957-58.
83. Id. at 962.
84. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 1384.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1384-85.
88. Id
89. Id at 1394.
90. Id
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competition within the NFL market, in essence allowing them to set
monopoly prices to the detriment of the consuming public. The rule
also effectively foreclosed free competition among stadiums such as
the Los Angeles Coliseum that wished to secure NFL tenants." 91 The
court further held that the rule was acutely harmful, "because it pre-
vented a move by a team into an existing team's market. If the trans-
fer was upheld, direct competition between the Rams and Raiders
would presumably ensue to the benefit of all who consume the NFL
product in the Los Angeles area."'92 Hence, Rule 4.3 violated antitrust
law and would not be enforced, consequently allowing the Raiders to
move to Los Angeles. 93
III
Congressional Response to Flood v. Kuhn
Congress has drafted legislation focused on lifting the exemption
many times, but the issue has never come to a vote.94 Both the Senate
and the House of Representatives have held hearings regarding Base-
ball's antitrust immunity, largely in response to the ousting of Fay Vin-
cent by the Owners, the St. Petersburg incident, and the latest
baseball player strike.95 A 1992 Senate Hearing resulted in no new
legislation96 but served to put Baseball on notice that it would be
under the close watch of Washington. A 1993 House Hearing resulted
in a discussion draft of H.R. 108, which would lift Baseball's antitrust
exemption,9' but that bill has not yet been put to a vote.
Most recently, in September of 1994, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee considered lifting Baseball's antitrust exemption.98 Although
Congress again failed to pass any legislation to lift the exemption, 99
there were some serious threats made by Congress for action in the
near future. Senator Mike Synar of Oklahoma explained, "[t]he death
toll is on for the antitrust exemption, the question is, do we do it this
session or next?"'1 Some legislators even threatened that if Baseball
did not settle the strike by the next time Congress convenes in January
91. Id. at 1395.
92. Id. at 1396.
93. Id. at 1401. See also Raiders Chronology, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1990, at A19.
94. Hearing 2, supra note 11.
95. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 2; Hearing 2, supra note 11.
96. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 56.
97. Hearing 2, supra note 11, at 17.
98. Larry Whiteside & Jill Zuckman, Committee Votes to Strike Antitrust, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1994, at 105.
99. Larry Whiteside, Antitrust Challenge is Off, BOSTON GLOBE, OCt. 1, 1994, at 71.
100. Whiteside & Zuckman, supra note 98.
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1995, the exemption would be lifted.10 1 The most stringent advocate
in favor of lifting the exemption was Senator Howard Metzenbaum of
Ohio, who retired before the January session. 10 2 The Senator parted
with some strong words for the Owners: "The Owners shouldn't pop
those champagne bottles yet. The lineup of senators [yesterday] who
promised to go to bat next year for this legislation is really impressive.
And I'll be back to lobby hard for the issue myself."'01 3 However, as
of March 1995 the strike was still going strong.
If Baseball is to maintain its antitrust exemption, Congress has
demanded that Baseball act in a manner to insure public confidence in
the game, in addition to conducting its affairs to benefit the public."°4
If Baseball does not use the exemption to benefit the public, the ex-
emption should be lifted.1
0 5
IV
Disempowerment of the Commissioner
A large measure of Baseball's popularity and appeal can be at-
tributed to public faith in the game as well as its true American
roots. 1°6 Historically, it is the commissioner's job to ensure Baseball
acts in a manner serving the American public and preserving its popu-
larity and appeal. 07
A. Birth and Evolution of the Commissioner's Office
The position of the commissioner traditionally was more power-
ful than that of the Owners and governed a sport Which, to this day,
operates mainly outside the realm of judicial review. 0 8 The office of
the commissioner was established in 1921 following the scandalous
1919 World Series. In that series, although the Chicago White Sox
were heavy favorites to beat the Cincinnati Reds in the World Se-
ries, 10 9 large amounts of money were bet on the Reds. When the
101. Ross Newhan, Congress Won't Act on Baseball Exemption, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1994, at C2.
102. Mark Maske, Congress Halts Efforts on Antitrust Exemption, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1994, at B3.
103. Id.
104. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 3 (statement of Fay Vincent, former Commissioner of
Baseball).
105. Id.
106. HAROLD SEYMOUR, 2 BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 5 (1971).
107. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 3 (statement of Fay Vincent, former Commissioner of
Baseball).
108. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D, II1. 1931).
109. DAVID Q. VOIGT, 2 AMERICAN BASEBALL Xiii-XViii (1970).
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Reds won the Series, 110 rumors immediately circulated that the Series
was fixed. 11'
Baseball began to receive highly negative publicity as a conse-
quence of the "Black Sox" scandal, so the Owners implemented a new
governing structure.112 The Owners installed a single person, the
commissioner, to preside over the game with virtually absolute pow-
ers.1 3 The commissioner was to be an individual from outside of
Baseball, who had impeccable character and would serve to restore
public confidence in the game by protecting its integrity against
corruption."
4
Owners called upon a Chicago district court judge, Kennesaw
Mountain Landis, to restore Baseball's reputation in the eyes of the
American public. Once Judge Landis received the offer to become
Commissioner of Baseball, he demanded control over "whatever and
whoever" had to do with Baseball." 5 The new Major League Agree-
ment gave the commissioner very broad power to deal with any action
deemed detrimental to the best interests of Baseball" 6 and to take
whatever punitive or remedial action considered necessary. Further-
more, the Owners agreed to be bound by any decisions made by the
commissioner and waive their right of recourse to the courts.
1 17
Under the new agreement, the Owners subjected themselves to an
outsider who would rule Baseball with unlimited authority."
8
110. Id. at 124.
111. Id. at 124-125. See SEYMOUR, supra note 106, at 294-310. The term "fixed game"
refers to a game wherein one team or a player or players on a team intentionally attempts
to lose or not cover the betting spread. The incentive to fix games is usually provided by a
gambler's offer of money to the player(s) for poor performance. The gambler in turn is
able to make money by wagering on a game whose outcome he has largely predetermined.
Id.
112. See SEYMOUR, supra note 106, at 259-73.
113. Id.
114. See VOIGT, supra note 109, at 132-33.
115. Id. at 138. See also SEYMOUR, supra note 106, at 322.
116. See SEYMOUR, supra note 106, at 322.
117. Id.
118. The current duties and authority of the commissioner include investigation, disci-
pline, and formulating policies, all with the purported object of furthering the interest of
baseball. Major League Agreement, art. I, § 2 provides the duties and authority of the
commissioner are:
(a) THE COMMISSIONER shall be the chief executive officer of Major League
Baseball.
(b) TO INVESTIGATE, either upon complaint or upon his own initiative, any
act, transaction or practice charged, alleged or suspected to be not in the best
interests of the national game of Baseball, with authority to summon persons and
order the production of documents, and, in case of refusal to appear or produce,
to impose such penalties as are hereinafter provided.
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Again, the powers of the commissioner are very broad empower-
ing him to act in "the best interest" of baseball and to ensure the in-
tegrity of the game." 9 With the exemption in place, the powers of the
commissioner would remain absolute and serve to keep Baseball,
more specifically, the Owners, acting in accordance with the notion of
benefitting the American public. 2 ' In 1947 former Baseball Commis-
sioner Happy Chandler broke Baseball's longstanding tradition by de-
creeing that blacks be allowed into the game.' 2' Before leaving office
in 1951, Chandler made a public statement with another democratic
sentiment: "I always regarded baseball as our National Game that
belongs to 150 million men, women and children, not to sixteen spe-
cial people who happen to own big league teams." 22
B. The Commissioner's Office Today
The office of the Commissioner still exists today. However, the
position has not been filled since Commissioner Fay Vincent was
forced to resign from the office on September 7, 1992.123 In place of
Vincent, the Owners appointed the president of the Milwaukee Brew-
ers, Bud Selig, as chairman of the ruling executive council. 24 Absent
a commissioner, chairman of the ruling executive council is the high-
est-ranking official of Baseball.12 5 Ironically, Selig has maintained he
does not want the job of commissioner despite serving as the acting
commissioner for two and one-half years.126 It may be argued that
Selig's job is to act impartially with regard to the Owners, players, and
(c) TO DETERMINE, after investigation, what preventive, remedial or punitive
action is appropriate in the premises, and to take such action either against Major
Leagues, Major League Clubs or individuals, as the case may be.
(d) TO HEAR and determine finally any dispute between the Major Leagues
which may be certified to him for determination by the President of either Major
League.
(e) TO FORMULATE, and from time to time announce, the rules of procedure
to be observed by the Commissioner and all other parties in connection with the
discharge of his duties. Such rules shall always recognize the right of any party in
interest to appear before the Commissioner and be heard and the right of the
President of the two Major Leagues to appear and be heard upon any matter
affecting the interests of the major Leagues, or either of them.
Id.
119. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 117-18.
120. Id. at 119.
121. Id. at 320.
122. Id.
123. Ross Newhan, Baseball Changes Top Job, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1994, at C1.
124. Mark Maske, Selig Said to Be Making $1 Million-a-Year Salary, WASH. POST, Feb.
16, 1994, at B4.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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the American public. However, whoever pays him can arguably cre-
ate a bias in the interim commissioner's decisions. Baseball Owners
currently pay Selig a reported salary of one million dollars, $350,000
more than the previous commissioner. 127 One Owner said he has "no
problem" with Selig's salary "because the ... owners generally have
been pleased with Selig's performance.'
' 28
Although Baseball Owners have taken over two and one-half
years to appoint a new commissioner, they have opted to make
changes regarding the position. In February 1994 the Owners an-
nounced that they have stripped the commissioner of the power to act
"in the best interest of baseball.' 1 29 This change severely limits the
commissioner's power to act.
Now the question is what authority does the Commissioner of
Baseball have? The new provisions prevent the commissioner from
using the "best interest canopy to affect the World Series and post-
season play, scheduling, interleague play, divisional alignment, expan-
sion, sale of teams, the relocation of teams and revenue sharing."' 130
Instead, these essential powers have been transferred to the Owners.
Ironically, at a hearing months before these changes occurred, in-
terim commissioner Bud Selig announced before the Committee on
the Judiciary, "I can assure you that the next commissioner-the past
commissioners have had great authority. The next commissioner will
have at least the same authority if not more. ' ' 13 1 The curtailing of the
power of the commissioner was met by scathing remarks from Capitol
Hill. Senator Howard Metzenbaum, chairman of the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights explained:
It makes the commissioner's position a nullity ... it flies in the
face of the promises the owners made to Congress to preserve the
office of the commissioner. It undermines their own argument about
why baseball is different from the other sports and is proof positive
that baseball is a business and should be treated like any business
and should be stripped of their exemption.
132
Rather than reform Baseball to gain favor in Washington to
maintain their exemption, the Owners have chosen to deal with politi-
cians on an individual level.133 For example, for the 1993 All-Star
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Senator Blasts Weakening of Commissioner's Powers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 1994,
at B5.
130. See Newhan, supra note 123, at C1.
131. Hearing 2, supra note 11, at 11.
132. Senator: Owners Act "Absurd," BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 15, 1994, at C3.
133. Mark Woods, Baseball Uses Unethical Means to Protect Antitrust Exemption, USA
TODAY, June 9, 1993, at C4.
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game, interim commissioner Bud Selig sent a form letter to every
member of the House and Senate, offering them each two tickets in
"good seat locations" for the game."M Congressman Jim Bunning of
Kentucky responded by saying, "[i]f that isn't legalized bribery, I
don't know what is." '135 Recognizing the importance of congressional
lobbyists, Baseball established its own lobbyist in Washington D.C.1 3 6
Following the December 10, 1993 congressional hearing concerning
Baseball's antitrust exemption, Baseball's executive council even cre-
ated a new position formally identified as "Director of Governmental
Relations" to interact "with members of Congress and their respective
staffs to explain and advocate baseball's position on various public
issues. "137
V
Baseball's Disregard for the Public Interest
Baseball has disregarded the public interest on a multitude of
fronts. As discussed earlier, the antitrust exemption enables the Own-
ers to force municipalities to make economic concessions. 38 Baseball
has also practiced lax and inconsistent enforcement of its player drug
abuse policies over the past twelve years. During the absence of a
true commissioner over the past two and one-half years, Baseball's
accountability has continued to flounder. It is the commissioner's sole
responsibility to approve all player transactions and franchise loca-
tions, and to discipline players and Owners who do not act in the "best
interests of baseball.' 39 Yet the duties of the interim commissioner,
Bud Selig, have been replaced by Baseball's executive council, which
has failed to effectively discipline players and Owners for misconduct.
Baseball does not have an established drug policy between the
players' union and management. The lack of a policy has led to incon-
sistent enforcement for drug offenses by players.' 40 In the last dozen
years, twenty-nine players have received suspensions from the com-
missioner for drug offenses ranging from thirty days to a lifetime ban
in the case of current New York Yankee pitcher Steve Howe.' 4' Only
eleven of these players, however, actually served the full term of their
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Marty Noble, Arena, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1993, at 161.
137. Id.
138. See supra part II.
139. Major League Agreement, art. I, § 2(b).
140. Barry Cooper, Gooden Should Put the Walk Before the Talk, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Nov. 13, 1994, at C21.
141. Drug Suspensions, HARTFORD COURANT, June 29, 1994, at C2.
BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION19951
suspension. 142 In the case of Howe, the pitcher has been bounced
from baseball seven times for cocaine abuse.143 For the last offense,
then Commissioner Fay Vincent finally issued a lifetime ban.'" The
ban, though, was overturned when Howe creatively argued that his
"attention deficit hyperactivity disorder led to his drug use .'. . and
that baseball was partly to blame by not preventing his arrest through
regular testing."'
1 45
Baseball's credibility in the public eye has diminished at an in-
credible rate since owner Bud Selig began acting as interim commis-
sioner two and one-half years ago. A prime example of Selig's
inefficient response to player misconduct involved former New York
Met Vince Coleman. In 1993, Coleman threw a powerful firecracker
out of a car window into a crowd of several hundred autograph seek-
ers.146 Three people, including an eleven year-old boy and a one year-
old girl, suffered injuries. 47 The Mets, not the Owners, suspended
Coleman for the rest of the season.'" The Mets then traded Coleman
and his three million dollar salary to the Kansas City Royals for for-
mer Met Kevin McReynolds. 49
While the Coleman incident represents players running amok
without discipline from the interim commissioner, Bud Selig and
Baseball's executive council have been even less responsive to Owner
misconduct. Before Selig took on the duties of interim commissioner,
George Steinbrenner, majority owner and general partner of the New
York Yankees, had been banned from participating in the day-to-day
operations of the Yankees as of August 1990.150 Steinbrenner had
paid $40,000 to a gambler and "sleaze artist," Howard Spira, for infor-
mation of supposed illegal activity concerning Dave Winfield, a for-
mer Yankee player.' 51 Two and one-half years later, Steinbrenner was
back at the helm of the Yankees.
152
142. Id.
143. Jerry Kirshenbaum, Mercy Me, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 23, 1992, at 13.
144. Id.
145. Jon Heyman, Howe Now, NEWSDAY, Feb. 22, 1993, at 86.
146. Jerry Kirshenbaum, Pitiful Throw, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 2, 1993, at 11.
147. Id.
148. Coleman Finished with Mets, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1993, at 3.
149. Mets Find a Home for Coleman, CI-. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1994, at 2.
150. The Agreement, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1990, at C5.
151. Shirley Povich, Boss Returns as Man of the People, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at
C1.
152. March Madness: The Boss Is Back; Steinbrenner Regains Yankee Reins, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at El.
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The 1993 season further exemplified Baseball's lack of public re-
sponsibility upon the dismantling of the San Diego Padres. 153 On Au-
gust 1, 1992, the San Diego Padres were four and one-half games out
of first place in their division; less than one year later they were in
sixth place, twenty games below five-hundred.' 54 The Padres, in a bla-
tant effort to cut their payroll from $29.2 million to under ten million
dollars, traded away the best and consequently highest paid players on
the team.' 55 One of the players traded away was Gary Sheffield, the
National League batting champion, who was only twenty-four years
old.
156
It is critical to keep in mind that normally all such transactions
must be approved by the commissioner, who at the time was not in
office. Thus, it was the Owners who approved the various transactions
which stripped the San Diego Padres of all of the talent that had left
them so close to winning the division the previous season. 157 More
importantly, at the beginning of the season Padre season ticket hold-
ers were promised in a written letter from the Padre's Owner that the
team would not be trading away its core players. 5 ' Following the
trades, the season ticket holders filed a class-action suit against the
Padres.'5 9 By dismantling a pennant contender, it certainly appears
the San Diego Padres, whose actions were approved by the Owners,
acted with disregard to the people of San Diego. Local San Diego
radio personality Lee Hamilton responded in dismay, "I have to bite
my tongue to keep from saying something slanderous on the air. I
have a passion for this game. A baseball franchise is a public trust, as
well as a business."'160
In another incident, in December 1992 Cincinnati Reds owner
Marge Schott, was vilified by the press for using racial slurs. She did
not deny that she used the terms "Jap" and "money-grubbing
Jews."' 6 1 She also conceded she may have referred to Martin Luther
153. Allan Malamud, Notes on a Scorecard, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at C3.
154. Dave Sheinin, Fire Sale in San Diego Leaves Players, Fans Steaming; Padres Feel
Squeezed by Bigger Markets, WASH. POST, July 5, 1993, at D7.




158. Padres, Fans Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at B9.
159. Newhan, supra note 155, at C7. A judge approved settlement of the suit accusing
the Padres of defrauding season ticket holders. The plaintiffs (season ticket owners)
agreed to drop a request for punitive damages in exchange for a refund of their tickets.
The club also agreed to donate 10,000 tickets to charity. Padres, Fans Settle Lawsuit, supra
note 158.
160. Malamud, supra note 153.
161. 93 Things That Went Right in '93, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 27, 1993, at 42.
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King Day as "Nigger Day."'62 Finally she "wasn't sure" whether she
told a Jewish employee that "Hitler might have had the right idea."' 63
As a result of her actions, Schott faced a suspension and a fine of as
much as $250,000 at the discretion of Baseball's executive council,"6 a
duty normally relegated to the commissioner. The Committee fined
Schott only $25,000 and suspended her for one year.' 65 Schott is cur-




Several proposals that are intended to address the unchecked
power of the Owners and the sport's recent disregard for the public
interest have been made. A few are presented here.
A. Interpret Flood Narrowly
District and state courts may read Flood very narrowly and inter-
pret the antitrust exemption as applying only to the reserve clause.
One district court has already done so in Piazza v. Major League
Baseball. 67 The case involved several members of the Tampa Bay
Investment Group who filed an antitrust action regarding the group's
bid to relocate the San Francisco Giants to Florida. Baseball moved
to dismiss the case due to their antitrust exemption. In denying the
motion, the court specifically stated that "in 1972, the Supreme Court
made clear that the Federal Baseball [antitrust] exemption is limited to
the reserve clause.'1 68 Moreover, the Piazza court acknowledged that
the three previous baseball exemption cases, Flood, Toolson, and Fed-
eral Baseball, dealtsolely with Baseball's reserve clause.' 69 The East-
ern District of Pennsylvania would have been the first jurisdiction to
allow a case involving the relocation of a baseball team to go forward
and be tried on the merits. Jury selection for the Piazza case was to
begin on September 29, 1994.171 On the evening before jury selection
was to begin, however, the parties reached an undisclosed settle-
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Richard O'Brien, Block That Schott, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 7, 1992, at 15.
165. John Leo, Baseball Owners Punish Speech, But Not Behavior, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Feb. 9, 1993, at B7.
166. Maradona Returns As Argentina Ties Australia, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at C12.
167. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
168. Id. at 436.
169. Id. at 437.
170. Hank Greziak, Early Settlement Rains Out Baseball Antitrust Trial, PA. L. WKLY.,
Oct. 10, 1994, at 8.
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ment.171 It appears that Baseball was reluctant to go forward with the
case, perhaps recognizing their tenuous position.
A second case stemming from the Tampa Bay Investment Group,
Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,172 was
decided by the Supreme Court of Florida on October 6, 1994. The
case was brought by Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth,
acting upon an antitrust civil investigation demand (CID).'73 The
Florida Supreme Court ultimately held that Baseball's exemption only
extends to the reserve system, and that the Attorney General's CIDs
to the National League regarding the sale and purchase of the San
Francisco Giants baseball franchise may proceed. 74 If Butterworth is
appealed and granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, we may see
the fatal blow for the antitrust exemption.
B. Lift the Exemption
Because the Supreme Court created the exemption, it is the most
efficient vehicle to lift it. In Flood the Court refused to overturn the
exemption due to congressional silence. 75 Although Congress has yet
to pass legislation concerning the exemption, to define their actions as
silent is inappropriate. In fact, when the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Baseball's antitrust exemption in Flood, it noted that over fifty bills
had been introduced with respect to Baseball over the previous
twenty years.'
76
The exemption needs to be addressed by the Supreme Court once
again. It is somewhat evident that Congress will continue to juggle the
problem without producing any significant legislation. The Court can
lift the exemption in one clean swoop, finally putting Baseball on
equal, legal footing with other sports and businesses at large. The
Butterworth case may provide the Supreme Court with another chance
to overturn the exemption.
C. Guidelines for Franchise Acquisitions and Relocations
Because franchise relocations and formations seem to be where
the abuse of the exemption appears most prevalent, the legislature, in
conjunction with Baseball, should form clear guidelines in these areas.
The guidelines must fit within the framework of Section 1 of the Sher-
171. Id.
172. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
173. Id. at 1022.
174. Id. at 1025.
175. 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
176. Id. at 284.
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man Act and should be required to ensure league restraints regarding
expansion and relocation conform with the Rule of Reason approach.
There are four fundamental issues inherent in all Section 1 cases
challenging sports league restraints: 1. Does the challenged league
rule or practice qualify for the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion from Sherman Act coverage? 2. Is a league, at least in the partic-
ular case, a single economic firm whose internal management
practices and rules lack the necessary plurality of actors for a Section
1 violation? 3. Is the challenged player practice or rule inherent in, or
ancillary to, the formation and existence of a lawful joint venture and
thus per se lawful under Section 1? 4. Does the challenged player
practice or rule satisfy the Rule of Reason test?
177
Courts could examine the above questions in suits involving re-
strictions of expansion and relocation on a case by case basis as evi-
denced by Los Angeles Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League.178  In the L.A. Coliseum case, the NFL's restriction on
franchise relocation was held to be unreasonable because the rule
179
the NFL used to block a move was held to be an unreasonable restric-
tion upon competition.' °
Baseball's actions with regard to the relocation of the Giants to
St. Petersburg is an effective comparison because these actions illus-
trate the need for Baseball to be held to the Rule of Reason standard.
Baseball's constitution requires a three-quarter vote of approval by
the Owners before a team can relocate. 18  Although the NFL's Rule
4.3 contained the same three-quarters owners' approval clause with
177. Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of
Stare Decisis, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 337 (1986).
The Rule of Reason forms the basis for traditional section 1 analysis, which in its
general framework is well known. Basically, all agreements between independent
firms are to be tested under the Rule of Reason, and in order to be found lawful
such agreements must survive both the application of per se categories of illegal-
ity and full blown rule of reason scrutiny. Section 1 prohibits "[elvery contract,
combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." The Supreme Court recog-
nized as early as 1911 that because every contract restrains trade to some extent,
section 1 could not be applied literally without destroying the ability of all private
parties to enter into contracts. Accordingly, the Court proscribed only those re-
straints that were unreasonable-thus, the Rule of Reason-and adopted an
analysis requiring the fact finder to weigh all circumstances in determining
whether an illegal restraint on competition was involved.
Id. at 340 n.9 (citations omitted).
178. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
179. The rule required three-quarter approval by the NFL owners whenever a team
sought to relocate in the home territory of another. In this case, the Oakland Raiders
sought to move into the home territory of the Los Angeles Rams. Id. at 1385.
180. Id. at 1401. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
181. Major League Agreement, art. V, § 2.
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regard to franchise relocation, it was held to violate the Sherman Act
and was struck down.182 Absent the antitrust exemption, Baseball's
relocation rules may be held in violation of the Sherman Act. Hence,
without the exemption, Baseball would be forced to draw specific
guidelines with regard to relocation, as opposed to leaving all deci-
sions to the whims of the Owners.
Critical issues which could be included in Baseball guidelines and
would help reinvigorate Baseball's supposed dedication to the public
interest would be local fan support, financial viability of the franchise
staying in the present location, the support and facilities of the city of
relocation, and the financial viability of the new location. If a team
has public support where it is currently located, there should be re-
strictions in place which prevent their franchise from moving. There-
fore, it would strongly take into account the public's decision whether
their team will go or stay. Regarding expansion, Congress has sug-
gested an agreement that would permit Baseball to expand by a cer-
tain number of teams every few years, which would be located in cities
which could support and finance a franchise. 83
Ultimately, lifting the exemption would force Baseball to adhere
to the same Rule of Reason approach to the Sherman Act as all other
American sports and businesses. This would result in more fair play
in negotiations between Owners, minor and major league players, and
local municipalities.
D. Congressional Ultimatum to Grant Commissioner Absolute Authority
Baseball Owners have failed to elect a commissioner for over two
and one-half years and have stripped the "soon to be elected" com-
missioner, of his authority to act in the "best interest of baseball." It is
obvious that the Owners are in no hurry to put a commissioner in
place, let alone a commissioner with authority. If Baseball is to retain
its antitrust exemption, Congress should force the Owners to put an
autocratic commissioner in place by a specific date, or lose the exemp-
tion. Without a powerful commissioner to represent the interests of
the public at large, the Owners will continue to serve only their own
narrow interests. Chicago White Sox owner Jerry Reinsdorf, one of
the proponents of ousting Commissioner Fay Vincent in 1992, illumi-
nated the thinking of many of the Owners when he said that the job of
the next Commissioner of Baseball will be to "run the business for the
owners, not the players or the umpires or the fans."'"
182. Coliseum Commission, 726 F.2d at 1398.
183. Hearing 2, supra note 11, at 265.
184. Hearing 1, supra note 4, at 2.
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Conclusion
Due to Baseball's antitrust exemption, the Baseball Owners have
had free reign regarding management of Baseball. Essentially, they
have acted as a cartel with little, if any, regard for the interests of the
American public. The one check that was implemented by Baseball in
1920 was the creation of the Baseball Commissioner's Office. The
new Baseball head was to be an outsider, someone of great character
who could restore public confidence in the game by protecting its in-
tegrity against corrupting influences.8 5 This was a direct result of the
Chicago "Black Sox" Incident, in which the White Sox players fixed
the World Series of 1919.186 Baseball has been without a commis-
sioner for two and one-half years now following the ouster of Com-
missioner Fay Vincent by the Owners. 8 7 Despite the urging of the
United States Congress and Baseball's promises to do so, a permanent
commissioner has yet to be installed by the Owners.'88
The antitrust exemption that was given to Baseball over seventy
years ago by the Supreme Court has become obsolete. In Flood the
Court, in a departure from earlier cases, explained that the exemption
must be lifted expressly by Congress. The Court pointed out that
Congress had remained silent regarding the exemption, and, because
of the silence, the Court would take no action. Congress has con-
fronted the issue on multiple occasions, although it has yet to pass
legislation. Moreover, in Flood the Court emphasized the special
place baseball has held in American culture. Indeed, baseball is sig-
nificant to American society, but the question remains: Is society im-
portant to baseball? The Owners' failure to name a permanent
commissioner in addition to permitting deplorable conduct of players
and owners to go unpunished would lead one to think the public is not
considered at all by the Owners. It is time for Baseball to play by the
rules. Playing by the rules necessitates the lifting of Baseball's anti-
trust exemption.
185. See VOIGT, supra note 109, at xiii-xxiii.
186. See SEYMOUR, supra note 106, at 52.
187. Senator Wants Baseball Czar, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 15, 1994, at C5.
188. Id.
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